“In Rhode Island, DUI, DWI, Driving Under the Influence, and Drunk Driving cases seem to provide motorists with minimized constitutional protections under the law.”
February 26, 2010
In Rhode Island, DUI, DWI, Driving Under the Influence, and Drunk Driving cases seem to provide motorists with minimized constitutional protections under the law. Most police agencies now take the position that the court-recognized status of a driver’s license as a privilege, coupled with the statutory authorization for chemical intoxication tests in driving-while-intoxicated cases, amounts to a waiver of a suspect’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination and the right to counsel prior to questioning and the giving of the test, unless otherwise provided by state law. Consequently, the normal order of police routine involves (1) a demand on the suspect to take the test, (2) extensive questioning, (3) performing the test, and finally, (4) an offer of an opportunity to the suspect to consult counsel.
In cases where the police should have recognized that the cause of the apparently intoxicated behavior was not alcohol, but was instead a medical condition from which the subject was suffering, a cause of action may exist against the police for failure to assure that the defendant was immediately delivered to a hospital for medical treatment. Of course, it becomes very important to provide alternate reasons for the suspect’s failure to properly perform standardized field sobriety tests.
In one Federal case, officers had probable cause to arrest motorist at roadblock, and such seizure did not violate his civil rights, where officer received report that possibly intoxicated driver was slumped over steering wheel of vehicle parked on shoulder of interstate, motorist’s appearance indicated that he had been drinking, motorist declined to answer officer’s questions and drove away without explanation, motorist failed to stop when officer engaged his emergency equipment, bumped motorist’s vehicle,and shot out his tires, and motorist swerved to prevent officer from passing him. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Latta v. Keryte, 118 F.3d 693 (10th Cir. 1997).
